I read good article in Aeon that has another discussion of the matter of approaching our treatment of animals with respect to the Kantian vs the Consequentialism approach. (refer to my previous entries on the dignity of mollusks) Peter Godfrey-Smith, in “Philosophers and Other Animals” (https://aeon.co/essays/why-korsgaards-kantian-argument-about-animals-doesnt-work) comments and critiques the approach of Christine Korsgaard in her book Fellow Creatures. (I have not read that one, but he writes that Korsgaard extends the Kantian approach from a universal principle among persons (what others would do in similar circumstances) to a more nuanced approach. Korsgaard thinks there is no inherent values, but values derive from valuers. We must respect what others value and that leads us to form moral judgments that are respectful of others—and the “others” include animals. Obviously, sentient creatures value life and avoiding not just pain but avoiding death.
Peter Godfrey-Smith doubts that all of us will respect the values of others. He thinks the approach of expecting each person to suss out the valuing process is questionable.
I am not really sure about this. First of all, I don’t see how the different the Korsgaard approach is from Peter Singer’s approach of respecting the preferences of others including the preferences of animals. But I think that this article helps to clarify the idea of “parity and consistency, as well as empathy, reverence and more” that Godfrey-Smith writes about in his approach to the veggie question. If we make a moral judgment about one thing, it should apply to a similar situation, that would be parity. And the simple notion of applying empathy to animals and respecting their values, or preferences, should be an important component of our moral decision making. As Adriel says, “I just want to live in peace with my fellow creatures on this earth.”
Two Strikes 