Heraclitus

Heraclitus, pre-Socratic.  “The Puzzler.”  We are all asleep, wake up and understand the logos (q.v.) which, of course he does not clearly explain.  From Ephesus in Asia Minor.  Did he meet up with Siddhartha, the Buddha?  Well he did believe in an essential principle or or “harmonia‘ to the world.  The ever changing reality.  Famous for

You can’t step in the same river twice.  

Here is some of the discussion on Coursera from Prof Susan S Meyer

heraclitus doc

Xenophanes

Xenophanes, pre-Socratic.  Sixth cent. Greek from Colophon.  Explored epistemology-there was a deeper truth that we could not completely know.  Posited there may be only one big god, almost pantheistic like Spinoza. Skeptic about religious belief, particularly anthropomorphism:

But if cattle or lions had hands, so as to paint with their hands and produce works of art as men do, they would paint their gods and give them bodies in form like their own—horses like horses, cattle like cattle.

 

 

Milesians

Milesians. Pre-Socratic, named for Miletus on Asia Minor coast across from Greece, 6th cent. BC. Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes.

Anaximenes takes air to be the basic material stuff, while earth, fire, and water are formed out of it by condensation and rarefaction: fire is the least dense; air is denser than fire, water denser than air, and earth the most dense.

Anaximander takes the infinite or the indefinite (apeiron) to be the basic material stuff

Thales (some call him the first philosopher), he thought water was the basic stuff of nature.

 

Ethics Essay: for Peter Singer’s Coursera Class

Topic Three: Would you answer both these questions in the same way?  Why, or why not?
i.                Is a physician ever justified in withdrawing life-support, including a respirator, from an infant so premature that it cannot breathe on its own?
ii.               Is a physician ever justified in giving a lethal injection to a severely disabled infant?
To both questions, I would answer affirmatively, that there are indeed cases where a physician would be justified in withdrawing life support from a premature infant, or in the case of a severely disabled infant, in giving a lethal injection.  Of course, several conditions must be met to for this serious measure to be justifiable.  The infant in question must at least be in a state meeting three conditions:  the infant cannot survive without extreme and constant measures of support to sustain basic life functions, that there is no reasonable expectation of improvement of the infant and no expectation of improvement in medical science to alleviate the condition, and that continuing the life of the infant means extraordinary suffering for the infant and family.
The first case, where life support is withdrawn, is a type of passive euthanasia.  The second case, where a lethal means is used to terminate life, is active euthanasia. Both situations are cases for considering non-voluntary euthanasia, that is, where euthanasia is warranted but the subject is unable to make the decision.1 Since the decision cannot be made by the infant, there should be a procedure followed that euthanasia is warranted and agreed to by parents, the physician, and be some third party such as a medical ethicist or civil authority.  The cases of infants are different than those of adults not only in the necessity for outside consent, but because infants are not equal to adults the evaluation of the morality of the decision.  This is best clarified by Peter Singer, who writes, that in consideration of the wrongness of killing, “characteristics like rationality, autonomy and self-consciousness that make a difference. Defective infants lack these characteristics.  Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing normal human beings….”2 
There are secondary considerations that should be given great weight.  Is the infant in a culture or in a religious hospital that forbids such a passive euthanasia?  Does the prevailing law of the locale or the protocols of the hospital allow or prohibit such action?  Will there be such enormous expense to continuing life support that may make the prolonged life unsustainable be the economy or the caregiver’s ability to sustain treatment?  Will the prolongation of life cause unbearable suffering on the part of the parents or caregivers, or, would the termination of life-support of the child cause unbearable mental anguish on the part of the parents?
Some might raise an objection claiming that all life, or all human life is sacred and must be maintained at all cost.  This position is extreme.  The life of some humans or potential humans is so diminished or defective or unbearable that it’s ending is not equal to the end of a fully adult, conscious, aware and pain-free life.
Giving a lethal injection to a severely defective infant can be justified, but requires some additional considerations.  Resorting to an active intervention to terminate life where the infant could survive with simple medical interventions could raise at least two objections.  The intention would be to kill, and traditional thinking about killing is that this act is inherently evil so that the permissibility test for the doctrine of double effect cannot me met.3 Additionally, there is a common sense and psychological aversion to actively killing an infant.  However, there can be two strong responses to these objections.   The severely defective infant is not a full human person in that there is no expectation of the development of rationality or a sense of self and the medical situation prevents any expectation of the development of autonomy.  Additionally, the result of either the passive or active intervention is death, so there is no difference at all in the most important thing to consider.  Furthermore, there is no “potential” humanity or “potential rights”, a value that ranks high for many.4
Some might argue that the parent’s or caregiver’s burden is not a secondary consideration at all, but is the most important and deciding factor.  The situation of an extremely defective infant sustained only by extreme means is not significantly different than a fetus.  Think about a position somewhat similar or analogous to that of Judith Jarvis Thompson, that no one has the right to use another person to sustain whatever life is available.  This would mean the parent’s rights to a full life unburdened by extreme emotional toll and financial burden of care of the infant.  However, if this is the primary concern, then we are giving little weight to the value of the admittedly defective infant or the serious moral implication of life or death considerations.  What is more, there is the danger of self-serving parents or medical caregivers who may be seeking relief of the burden of an infant whose condition does not warrant passive or active euthanasia.
1 definitions from Robert Young, “Voluntary Euthanasia,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/euthanasia-voluntary
2 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979 ed., page 131.
3 Alison McIntyre, ”Doctrine of Double Effect,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/
4 “Potential Human, Potential Rights,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/child/potential.shtml, accessed 7Apr2014

Introduced to Kierkegaard on Coursera, Oct-Nov 2013, Jon Stewart, Univ. of Copenhagen

I am just finishing up “Søren Kierkegaard: Subjectivity, Irony and the Crisis of Modernity” an online course in Coursera with Jon Stewart, PhD, professor at the University of Copenhagen.  Just a brief note or two (actually three):
~1.  Kierkegaard had a fresh an unusual insight into Socrates:  like Hegel he saw Socrates as revolutionary and his thought represents a turning point in Western ideas.  However, while Hegel was disappointed that Socrates never left us a clear an affirmative set of philosophical teachings, Kierkegaard saw the real value of Socrates as his pure negativity.  His relentless interrogations were maieutic only and he Kierkegaard saw his own mission in life as doing the same.
~2.  Kierkegaard, in his disputatious rebellion against the official Danish (Lutheran) Church (well, actually he was in perpetual dispute with damn near everybody) rejected doctrines that attempted to explain difficult beliefs such as the “God-man” of the Christians.  These were paradoxes and we must leave it at that.
~3.  Kierkegaard thought that it was useless to accept a belief, doctrine, or really anything we learn.  We must “appropriate” such knowledge.  Using the subjective freedom espoused by Socrates, we must make knowledge our own.
Here is my assigned essay from the course.  And I would just add my own cantankerous gripe.  While Stewart’s course was wonderfully lucid and well-prepared, the assignment of the essay violates one of the basic tenets of your Freshman English class, or in least in the way I taught it:  Don’t attempt to write a topic broad enough for a textbook in just a brief essay.  So out to the side in red ink I write on this, “Topic too broad, narrow this!”  But it was the assignment, no argument, so here is my attempt, my try (go ahead and look up the definition of “essay”).
Assigned:  What did Kierkegaard learn from his study of Socrates?  Why is this connection between Socrates and Kierkegaard still relevant in the world today?
       Certain of the outcome of the trial, Socrates says: “…to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing other than to regard oneself as wise when one is not” and that in fact, death may not be the greatest of evils as is thought by all men but the “greatest of all the goods for man.”  Socrates says that in this he may only appear wise, but only because he does not indulge in the “reproachable…ignorance of believing one knows what one does not know.” (Plato, Socrates’ Defense, 27).  Guided by an inner daemon, Socrates is content to go to death as he as lived, ceaselessly questioning the customary way of thinking and promoting the revolutionary concept that that wisdom is found not by consulting the gods but by finding within himself the truth.  Soren Kierkegaard, centuries later, is inspired by the courage of Socrates to challenge the customary, or “universal”, thought by seizing the subjective freedom to question what is thought of as certain, justifiable, and wise.  In a break from one of his other intellectual guides, G.W.F. Hegel, the Danish thinker fully accepts the negativity and irony of Socrates, and reproaches the adherents of Romantic despair as well as the complacent church.  Like Socrates, the life, thought, and writings of Kierkegaard are consistent in the assertion of the individual freedom of thought, the primacy of the subjective, and the right to question not only the temper of the times but its social and political thought. He reexamined Hegel and prominent teachers, artists and even his own church and Christianity’s most enduring beliefs.
            Probably Kierkegaard took from Socrates a mien that was more about doubt than about certitude, more about process than about conclusions.  Plato reports that after subjecting a poor slave of Meno with his relentless interrogation, that Socrates asks,  “Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions…?”  (Plato, Meno, Project Gutenberg, unpaginated text file).  Socrates admits “Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident.  But we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;–that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight , in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.”  (Plato, Meno).   So Kierkegaard, during the political and social tumult of revolutionary Europe following hard upon the former certainties of the Enlightenment, bravely confronts and even embraces irony and paradox but was ready to fight the excesses of irony which he saw as despair and alienation.  These difficulties he saw as worthy of relentless questioning:  Does the Romantic literature of the day inspire worthy individualism or is it so self-indulgent that subjective freedom of thought leads to relativism and a flight from the world of actuality?  Does an age of irony necessarily result in nihilism and cynicism?  Is it worthy to pose careful parsing of biblical mysteries or is this a form of modern sophistry in the face of apparent paradox?  Does individual autonomy and critical thinking lead to solipsism or are there objective and eternal truths that can be known?  Does moral truth arrive in a list of customary rules or is virtue only found in reflective morality, critical reflection?
            Kierkegaard was writing in the midst of the Romantic era.  A period of the sturm and drang of  warfare, political and industrial revolutions and defeat.  The Age of Enlightenment, with its science and careful thought, held reason to be the highest ideal.  But the high ideals of reason and modest individualism were seen as cold and science could raise up fearful monsters.  In Kierkegaard’s time emotion was the high ideal and individualism was taken to excess, ancient verities were dismissed, and the youthful aesthetes came to look at life itself as useless and meaningless.  The method or thinking process of Kierkegaard was to approach and critique these excesses with the irony and reflection of severe questioning that leads to some fundamental truth, to wrest from alienation a connection with truth.  Certainly the Socratic method used by Kierkegaard was not an easy road back to the complacent universal culture that was promoted by modern Sophists or the Enlightenment  scholars.  He writes “This universal culture reminds us of what is offered for sale in our time by scholarly vendors of indulgences under the name of enlightenment.” (Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony, 203-204).
            And today, a full 200 years from the birth of Soren Kierkegaard, the culture is still confronted with both the despair of nihilism and the comfortable certainties of unexamined faith.  Both religion and politics seem to be in an unending existential crisis. Is there any way to find truth within ourselves, or any worth in an examined life when we are trapped between moral license and doctrinaire extremism? The questioning of Socrates and the uses of negativity espoused by Kierkegaard may be the way to light a path along a dark path of alienation.  No doubt to follow in the way of Kierkegaard is to take a dangerous road, alone and unafraid of the dark.
            Bravely, in Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard takes on the story of Abraham and Isaac, which must surely be one of the most unsettling stories in Western culture.  To be commanded by God to destroy his own son, Abraham is faced with a moral dilemma of enormous proportions.  Choose the love for God or child; choose a higher telos or choose the normative ethic, the natural law written into Abraham and everyone and demanded by culture and law.  Kierkegaard says this story contains a teleological suspension of the ethical,  that is, an ethic of a higher sort.   He is both admiring of Abraham and appalled by him, he writes. He concludes from his critique of this story, both awesome and awful, that his examination does not lead him to a justification of the lesson.  If examined without casuistry, without forcing the lesson into a commonplace or acceptable doctrine, then one is left in silent acceptance.  It is a lonely feeling, for the story must remain a paradox and really only soundless faith is the lesson to be learned.   “This paradox cannot be mediated.”  (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 56).
            From Socrates, Kierkegaard revives the primacy of the subjective, the individual in the world of ideas and received wisdom.  At the end of the Enlightenment and beginning of the Romantic epochs, he is critical of the two excesses:  the Age of Reason with its cold calculations and the Romanticists’ dismissal of every form of ethic and tradition.  He writes:  “The subjective thinker, therefore, has also esthetic passion and ethical passion, whereby concretion is gained.  All existence-issues are passionate, because existence, if one becomes conscious of it involves passion.  To think about them so as to leave out passion is not to think about them at all, is to forget the point that one indeed is oneself and existing person.” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, from Google Books, The Essential Kierkegaard, 226).   The authentic person, fully exists and this involves passion and the difficult appraisal paradox:  “Paradox is the passion of thought”  (Philosophical Fragments, 37).   And in our present times, he would have likewise seen the anxiety and despair of people unmoored from belief and loss of authenticity as the “existing person” disappears.  Not a loss of self, but a full engagement of self is achieved by wanting “to discover something that thought itself cannot think” (Philosophical Fragments, 37).
            His Socratic methods are equally appropriate in the 20th and 21st centuries.  Cold science and passionless logic brought crimes of eugenics and later, with cold precision, the ovens of genocidal madness.  And then comes totalitarianism where individuals dissolve into states.  As a reaction there now exists, for some persons, massive indulgence in escapist literature, passionless art, and collapse into corruption, licentious abandon, pleasure seeking, and anomie.  For others an flight into thoughtless and extreme fundamentalism where individuals are servants of belief and violence against innocents is ethics.  An answer, possibly, is the path followed by Kierkegaard where subjective freedom is respected and each person takes on the heavy responsibility for self-reflection and commits to the ultimate respect for others individual freedom.
            One view of Kierkegaard’s connection to Socrates is that he perceived in Socrates self-appointed role a search for the authentic individual, or individual authenticity.  He saw in his own time passionless endeavors, nihilism, and witnessed individuals swallowed up in a mass and overbearing culture.  Today as well, the mass culture, exacerbated and promoted worldwide by the internet may well devour individuality and the uniqueness of persons so that existence becomes an unconscious and unexamined life.  The Socratic antidote provided by Kierkegaard is a passionate and essential embrace of individual thought, the examined life recommended by Socrates.  Where one is faced with the impossible task of sorting out an absolute paradox of faith, a reflective acceptance of contradiction is prescribed.  “Do I contradict myself?  Very well I contradict myself, I am large I contain multitudes” wrote the American poet in the ending year of Kierkegaard’s life. (Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, Stanza 51).  It requires a burden of considerable proportions to take on contradiction, paradox, faith, and tenets of current culture to embark on a journey toward the authentic self, upon a road where the self must confront paradox, tradition, religion, self-deception, and even existence.
             What value is to be found in Kierkegaard’s Socratic method of the examination of belief and in the importance of subjectivity to a non-Christian?  If Kierkegaard’s thought can lead him to declare that Socrates was a Christian, then the very idea of what it is to be a Christian may be applied to anyone, even those who know nothing of Christianity or reject it.  To live authentically, to live not just to exist, to live passionately, to bring together the finite within with the infinite, this could be a worthy achievement for anyone.  Perhaps it is the most vital, the critical and fundamental endeavor for anyone.    In a world in which everyone seems to make a connection in some electronic or virtual way, people may be deceived that such relationships are real or important in any substantial way.  Such a deception leads to despair, where the most important relationship is the self to the self.  Despair is drowning in a sea of the finite, the trivial, the least important.  It is a fatal illness.  A recognition of the authentic self requires a relationship with the infinite.  “Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal…” (Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, Chapter 1: That Despair is the Sickness Unto Death, Google Books, page 9).  To get there is the most important challenge of selfhood and such a challenge requires a Socratic examination over a lifetime.

Defacing the Currency

Apparently there were some coins found from Sinope that were found to be vandalized.  However, there is no doubt that Diogenes wanted to perpetuate the story that he actually damaged the coins of his city of birth to protest authority and custom resulting in a trial and exile.
True or not, defacing the currency is an apt metaphor for the kind of life advocated by Diogenes.  He wanted to break through the hypocrisy of everyday thoughtless morality, display convention and habit as shallow, and upset the powerful and self-satisfied citizens of Athens.  I am reminded of the yippies of the 1960s and 1970s who lived simply, maybe in primitive communes like the hippies but sought to parody and poke at middle class, humdrum lives and pieties.  They would sponsor slum tours, only not of slums, but of middle class suburban neighborhoods showing the boring habits of people devoted to their lawns and Buicks.  Defacing the currency.  Unlike the yippie poseurs, Diogenes lived a life of sparse, natural existence and showed that he believed enough of his own philosophy to promote it be demonstration.  Here is a picture, one of many similar paintings, by Jean-Leon Gerome (from wikimedia commons) of Diogenes living in a jar, lighting the lantern he uses to search for one good man.  He is admired by a troop of dogs, who gave him the name of his philosophy, four fine looking Cynics.